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ABSTRACT
We consider a multiple access channel where the users choose
their best power control strategy in order to selfishly max-
imize their energy-efficiency. To increase the utilities with
respect to the classical non-cooperative game, we introduce
hierarchy in two ways. On the one hand, assuming single-
user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg
formulation of the game where one user is the leader. On
the other hand, assuming neither leader nor followers among
the users, we introduce hierarchy by using successive in-
terference cancelation at the receiver. For both cases, we
study the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium and
compare the individual performance obtained in the hierar-
chical game with that obtained in the non-cooperative game.
An exhaustive comparative analysis of the two games is also
conducted. In order to optimize the choice of the leader in
the Stackelberg formulation (with single user decoding) and
that of the decoding order (in the non-cooperative game with
successive interference cancelation), we study two measures
of global energy-efficiency for the network and discussions
are provided for each case.
General Terms
Game theory, Wireless Communications.
Keywords
Energy-efficiency, multiple access channel, Nash equilibrium,
power control game, Stackelberg equilibrium.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider a decentralized multiple access
channels (MAC). By definition [1], the MAC consists of a
network of several transmitters and one receiver. The net-
work is said to be decentralized in the sense that the receiver
does not dictate to the users their transmit power levels.
Hence, each user can choose freely its power control policy
in order to selfishly maximize a certain individual perfor-
mance criterion, called utility (or payoff) in the context of
game theoretic studies. Unlike many works concerning this
problem, the chosen users’ utility is not the transmission
rate (e.g. [2, 3, 4]) but the energy-efficiency of their com-
munications. The latter approach, which consists in maxi-
mizing the ratio of the net number of information bits that
are transmitted without error per time unit to the trans-
mit power level, has been introduced in [5] for flat fading
channels and recently re-used by [6] for multi-carrier CDMA
(code division multiple access) systems and linear receivers,
motivated by the facts that mobile terminals have a limited
battery life and where in some applications (e.g. a sensor
network measuring a temperature field) the main concern is
not the transmission rate.
As mentioned in [5] the Nash equilibrium (NE) in such
games can be very energy inefficient. This is why [7] pro-
posed, for multiple access channels with flat fading links and
single-user decoding (SUD), a pricing mechanism to obtain
improvements in the users’ utilities with respect to the case
with no pricing. To our knowledge, since the release of [7],
no alternative way of tackling this problem in the context of
energy-efficient power control games has been proposed. In
this paper we propose an alternative approach to [7] for im-
proving the network efficiency by considering a Stackelberg
formulation of the problem when single-user decoding is as-
sumed at the receiver and also by using a more efficient (and
non-linear) decoding scheme namely successive interference
cancelation (SIC). As we will see, in both cases the receiver
only broadcasts common messages and the corresponding
amount of additional signalling is reasonable. Note that the
Stackelberg formulation arises naturally in some context of
practical interests. For example, this hierarchy is naturally
present in contexts where there are primary (licensed) users
and secondary (unlicensed) users who can sense their envi-
ronment because there are equipped with a cognitive radio
[8, 9]. It is also natural if the users access to the medium in
an asynchronous manner. Note that there have been many
works on Stackelberg games, even in the context of cogni-
tive radio [10], but they do not consider energy-efficiency for
the individual utility as defined in [5, 6, 11]. They rather
consider transmission rate-type utilities (see e.g. [12, 13, 3]).
This paper is structured as follows. The general signal
model is provided in Sec. 2. Sec. 3 reviews the main results
of [6] for the non-cooperative game. Then, in Sec. 4 we in-
troduce our Stackelberg formulation by arbitrarily choosing
a game leader, when SUD is assumed. In Sec. 5 we consider
a different receiver namely a successive interference canceler,
for which an arbitrary decoding order is chosen on each block
of data (or packets). The choice of the best leader and de-
coding order in terms of overall network energy-efficiency is
discussed in Sec. 6. In Sec. 7 we provide numerical results
to illustrate the theoretical results derived in the previous
sections. Additional comments and possible extensions of
this work are provided in Sec. 8.
2. SIGNAL MODEL
We consider a decentralized multiple access channel with
K users. Note that for sake of clarity and in order to have
a deep understanding of the addressed issues, this paper is
essentially dedicated to the game with two players. When
the K − user case (K > 2) is as tractable as the 2-user
case, the results will be written in the most general case.
Otherwise, this will always be mentioned explicitly. We as-
sume that the users transmit their data over block Rayleigh
flat fading channels and that the receiver knows on each
block the channel gains (coherent communication assump-
tion) whereas each transmitter has only access to the knowl-
edge of its own channel. The latter assumption is realistic
in systems where the uplink-downlink channel reciprocity is
valid or if a reliable feedback mechanism is available. Clearly
we only consider the framework of non-cooperative games
with complete information that is each rational user knows
the utilities of the others. The equivalent baseband signal
received by the base station can be written as
Y =
K∑
i=1
hiXi + Z (1)
with ∀i ∈ {1, ..., K}, E|Xi|
2 = pi, |hi| is a Rayleigh dis-
tributed random variable and Z ∼ CN (0, σ2). The channel
gains hi vary over time but are assumed to be constant over
each block.
3. REVIEWOF THE NON-COOPERATIVE
GAME
In the system under investigation, users are selfish in the
sense of their energy-efficiency. Here we review a few key
results [6, 7] concerning the non-cooperative game, which
we will use to analytically evaluate the benefits from intro-
ducing hierarchy in this game.
For any user i ∈ {1, ..., K} the receive single-user signal-
to-noise plus interference ratio (SINR) expresses as
SINRi =
pi|hi|
2∑
j 6=i pj |hj |
2 + σ2
(2)
where j 6= i. The strategy of user i ∈ {1, ..., K} consists in
choosing its transmit power level pi in order to maximize its
utility function which is chosen to be:
ui(p1, ..., pK) =
Ti
pi
=
Rif(SINRi)
pi
(3)
where f is an efficiency function representing the packet suc-
cess rate and Ri is the transmission rate [5, 6]. By definition
of the utility (Eq. (3)) we see that the frequency at which
the power control is updated is chosen to be the recipro-
cal of the data block duration. When it exists, the Nash
equilibrium of this game is given by
∀i ∈ {1, ..., K}, pNEi =
σ2
|hi|2
β∗
1− (K − 1)β∗
(4)
where β∗ is the positive solution of the equation
xf
′(x) = f(x). (5)
This type of equation has a positive solution if the function
f is sigmoidal [14], which is what is assumed in this paper.
The existence of a (non-trivial) Nash equilibrium is insured
provided that β∗ < 1
K−1
. Note that if β∗ ≥ 1
K−1
, this game
has still a Nash equilibrium if the transmit power is limited
i.e. pi ∈ [0, Pmax]. Therefore if the users have not enough
power to reach the SINR β∗ they will all transmit at their
maximum power, which is also an equilibrium. In this paper,
for sake of clarity, we will only consider the most interesting
(and non-trivial) regime where the transmit powers are less
than their maximal levels but all the results provided in this
paper easily extend to the case of finite powers. In this
regime, even if a user has an infinite transmit power he will
not necessarily use all of it. This is what Eq. (4) shows:
each player tunes its transmit power in order for his SINR
to be equal to β∗. In the sequel, we will denote by u
(NE)
i
the energy efficiency obtained by each player i at the NE.
Note that the problem formulation presented in this paper
can be applied to other types of systems, so our analysis is
not exclusively applicable to the signal model defined by Eq.
(1). For example, in flat fading CDMA systems, the SINR
after despreading (denoted by ˜SINRi) of the received signal
can be written in the same form as Eq. (2):
˜SINRi =
p˜i|hi|
2
∑
j 6=i p˜j |hj |
2
N
+ σ2
. (6)
where N is the spreading factor (also the processing gain)
of the CDMA system. The strategy of user i consists in
choosing its transmit power level p˜i in order to maximize its
utility function which is chosen to be:
ui(p˜1, . . . , p˜K) =
Ti
p˜i
=
R˜if˜( ˜SINRi)
p˜i
(7)
where f˜ is an efficiency function representing the packet
success rate. The study of the case of CDMA system can
be directly obtained from the signal model used in this pa-
per by observing that the two models are merely linked by
the following change of variables: pi =
p˜i
N
, Ri =
R˜i
N
and
f(x) = f˜(Nx), the SINR of user i becomes :
˜SINRi =
Npi|hi|
2∑
j 6=i pj |hj |
2 + σ2
(8)
and its utility can be rewritten as
ui(p1, . . . , pK) =
R˜if˜(N.SINRi)
p˜i
=
Rif(SINRi)
pi
(9)
where
SINRi =
pi|hi|
2∑
j 6=i pj |hj |
2 + σ2
. (10)
This clearly establish the link between our signal model and
that used by [6] for CDMA systems and flat fading channels.
Similarly its could also be linked to the case of CDMA sys-
tems with frequency selective channels as recently shown in
[15]. To conclude this remark on CDMA systems, it could be
verified [6, 15] that the denominator of the transmit power
at the NE becomes proportional to 1− β
∗
N
, which is in favor
of the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium in games under
investigation.
4. A HIERARCHICAL GAME WITH SIN-
GLE USER DECODING
As mentioned previously, one of our motivations for intro-
ducing hierarchy is to improve the network energy-efficiency.
The proposed approaches can be seen as intermediate schemes
between the totally centralized power control policy and the
non-cooperative policy of [5, 6]. It is also quite relevant
for flexible networks where the trend is to split the intelli-
gence between the network infrastructure and the (generally
mobile) users’ equipments. These approaches are therefore
reasonable ways of finding a desired trade-off between the
desired global network performance and amount of control
signalling sent by the receiver. In this section we propose
a Stackelberg formulation of the power control game where
one of the (two) users is chosen to be the leader. This means
that the receiver is not a player of the game. In this re-
spect we will always assume in this section that single-user
decoding is implemented at the receiver. The motivations
for using SUD can be precisely that the receiver has to re-
main neutral in the game or/and for limiting the receiver
complexity. In Sec. 6 we will however use a second Stackel-
berg formulation (similar to that used by [3] for water-filling
games where Shannon transmission rates are considered for
the users’ utilities) where the receiver uses SIC and has its
own utility.
Here, we consider without loss of generality (but possibly
with a loss of optimality) that user 1 is the leader of the
game and user 2 is the follower. The key idea is to consider
that there is a cognitive user who is the follower and react
after sensing the power level played by user 1 (more pre-
cisely, what needs to be known is |h1|
2P1). If such a sensing
mechanism is difficult or impossible in the context of in-
terest, another way for the follower to have this knowledge
is to receive it from the base station. Indeed, if the base
station broadcasts the necessary information to the users,
one obtains a game which is mathematically identical (it is
not equivalent physically e.g because more signalling is re-
quired from the receiver). Note that often, in the case of
coherent communications, the base station has an estimate
of each |hi|
2Pi; they can be estimated, for example, by using
the training sequence sent by each user. Interestingly, it is
possible to show that, under realistic conditions, there is a
unique equilibrium in this hierarchical game, which we call
a Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). Before indicating how the
users determine their optimal transmit power let us define
a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Definition 4.1 (Stackelberg equilibrium). A strat-
egy profile (pSE1 , p
SE
2 ) is called a (pure) Stackelberg equilib-
rium if pSE1 maximizes the single-variable utility of the leader
and pSE2 ∈ BR2(p1), where the notation BRj(pi) stands for
best response of player j to player i 6= j.
By denoting (pSE1 , p
SE
2 ) the power profile at the SE, this
definition translates mathematically as
p
SE
1 = arg max
p1
u1(p1, p2(p1)), (11)
with for all p1,
BR2(p1) = arg max
p2
u2(p1, p2), (12)
and pSE2 = BR2(p
SE
1 ). Now we look at the problem of the
existence and uniqueness of such a pair of transmit power
levels. A solution to these issues is stated through the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 4.2. (Existence and uniqueness of an
SE). There is a unique equilibrium in the proposed hierar-
chical game (pSE1 , p
SE
2 ):
p
SE
1 =
σ2
|h1|2
γ∗(1 + β∗)
1− γ∗β∗
and pSE2 =
σ2
|h2|2
β∗(1 + γ∗)
1− γ∗β∗
,
if the following (sufficient) conditions hold: f
′′(0)
f ′(0)
≥ 2β∗
and φ(x) = x(1 − β∗x)f ′(x) − f(x) has a single maximum
in ]0, γ∗[, where β∗ is the positive solution of the equation
xf ′(x)−f(x) = 0 and γ∗ the positive solution of the equation
φ(x) = 0.
Proof. Using the utility function defined by Eq. (9), we
obtain that for all p1, the optimal decision for the follower,
given the power of the leader, is to choose the power
p
SE
2 (p1) = β
∗(p1|h1|
2 + σ2)
1
|h22|
. (13)
Plugging this value in the utility function of user 1, we ob-
tain:
u1(p1) =
R1f
[
p1|h1|
2
β∗p1|h1|2+σ2(1+β∗)
]
p1
,
R1f [g(p1)]
p1
. (14)
We have that pSE1 has to verify p
SE
1 g
′(pSE1 )f
′
[
g(pSE1 )
]
=
f
[
g(pSE1 )
]
. This equation is equivalent to finding p1 such
that
g(p1)f
′ [g(p1)] = f [g(p1)]
(
1 +
β∗
1 + β∗
|h1|
2
σ2
p1
)
. (15)
Define x by x , p1|h1|
2
β∗p1|h1|2+σ2(1+β∗)
. Studying the existence
and uniqueness issues for p1 is equivalent to analyzing those
of x0 such that φ(x0) = 0 with
φ(x) = x(1− β∗x)f ′(x)− f(x) (16)
where:
• 1. f is continuous over [0, +∞);
• 2. f(0) = 0;
• 3. ∀x ≥ 0, f ′(x) ≥ 0;
• 4. as f is S-shaped we can define an xc such that
∀x ≤ xc, f
′′(x) ≥ 0 and ∀x ≥ xc, f
′′(x) ≤ 0;
• 5. lim
x→+∞
f(x) = const.
Recall that const = 1 in [6]. This property is essential to
insure the existence and uniqueness of β∗. In fact, to be
more rigorous, a condition of the corresponding convergence
rate has to be added to insure lim
pi→0
ui(pi) = 0. Therefore our
problem boils down to knowing the sign of φ′(x) for x ≥ 0.
Existence of x0. We know that φ(0) = 0 and ∀x ≥
1
β∗
, φ(x) < 0. Therefore if we can prove that f is lo-
cally strictly positive on the interval ]0, 1
β∗
[ the existence
of x0 will be guaranteed. A sufficient condition for the ex-
istence of x0 is
f ′′(0)
f ′(0)
≥ 2β∗. To check this use φ′′(x) =
−2β∗f ′(x) + f ′′(x) + x [−4β∗f ′′(x) + (1− β∗x)f ′′′(x)] and
call for the Taylor-Lagrange theorem: there exists c ∈]0, x[
such that φ(x) = φ′′(0)x
2
2
+ φ′′′(c) c
3
6
. The quantity c
3
x2
≤ x
can be made arbitrary small in the neighborhood of zero.
The proposed sufficient condition insures the convexity of φ
and φ is therefore locally strictly positive.
Uniqueness of x0. Straightforward.
In order to have an idea to what extent the sufficient con-
dition stated in Prop. 4.2 is realistic, we consider the prac-
tical choice of efficiency function proposed by [5] and also
used by [6, 11]: f(x) = (1 − e−x)M where M is the block
length (this function is a reasonable model for evaluating the
packet success rate of a transmission). Assuming this func-
tion, we have φ′(x) = e−x
[
β∗x2 − (2β∗M + 1)x + M − 1)
]
and the existence and uniqueness of pSE1 and p
SE
2 readily
follows from the above proof.
At this point, at least two questions arise:
• From a user point of view, is it better to be chosen to
be a leader or a follower?
• With respect to the Nash equilibrium what is the gain
brought by introducing hierarchy? Do all the players
benefit from this?
The first question is answered in Prop. 4.3 whereas the latter
questions are the purpose of Prop. 4.4.
Proposition 4.3. (Following is better than lead-
ing). Any user has always a better utility by being chosen
as a follower than a leader.
Proof. We denote by u
(SE)
L (resp. u
(SE)
F ) the utility of
user i ∈ {1, 2} when he is chosen to be the leader (resp.
follower) of the game. First, we observe that we have that
the SINR for the leader and the follower are: SINR
(SE)
L =
γ∗ and SINR
(SE)
F = β
∗. From [14], we have that for all
x > 0
x > β
∗ ⇔ xf ′(x) < f(x). (17)
As for all x > 0, x(1 − β∗x)f ′(x) < xf ′(x) from a simple
geometrical argument we see that γ∗ < β∗. This means that
the SINR of the follower (i.e. β∗) is higher than the SINR
of the leader (i.e. β∗). Therefore, we can write that
u
(SE)
L
u
(SE)
F
= f(γ∗)
|hi|
2
σ2
1− β∗γ∗
γ∗(1 + β∗)
1
f(β∗)
σ2
|hi|2
β∗(1 + γ∗)
1− β∗γ∗
=
f(γ∗)
γ∗
f(β∗)
β∗
1 + γ∗
1 + β∗
=
h(γ∗)
h(β∗)
1 + γ∗
1 + β∗
≤ 1
where the inequality follows from γ∗ ≤ β∗ and the fact that
function h : x 7→ f(x)
x
reaches its maximum in β∗.
The main issue we need to address now is the compari-
son between the non-cooperative and hierarchical games in
terms of energy efficiency. Specifically we want to compare
the values of ui(p
SE
1 , p
SE
2 ) and ui(p
NE
1 , p
NE
2 ), for each player
i ∈ {1, 2}. This is stated through the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. (Uniform improvement of utili-
ties). We always assume that single-user decoding is used
at the receiver. Then, in the Stackelberg formulation, both
the leader and follower improve their utilities with respect to
the non-cooperative setting.
Proof. (i) The follower improves his utility. Denoting
by i the index of the follower we have:
u
(SE)
i
u
(NE)
i
= f(β∗)
|hi|
2
σ2
1− β∗γ∗
β∗(1 + γ∗)
1
f(β∗)
σ2
|hi|2
β∗
1− β∗
=
1
1 + γ
∗−β∗
1−β∗γ∗
≥ 1
where the inequality follows from 0 ≤ γ∗ ≤ β∗ < 1.
(j) The leader improves his utility. Denoting by j 6= i the
index of the leader we have:
u
(SE)
j
u
(NE)
j
= f(γ∗)
|hj |
2
σ2
1− β∗γ∗
γ∗(1 + β∗)
1
f(β∗)
σ2
|hj |2
β∗
1− β∗
=
f(γ∗)
γ∗
(1− β∗γ∗)
f(β∗)
β∗
[1− (β∗)2]
=
g(γ∗)
g(β∗)
where g : x 7→ f(x)
x
(1 − β∗x). It can be checked that
g′(x) = x(1−β
∗x)f ′(x)−f(x)
x2
= φ(x)
x
where φ is defined by Eq.
(16). From this analysis we know that ∀x ∈ [γ∗, β∗], φ(x) ≤
0, which shows that the function g is non-increasing over
[γ∗, β∗]. Therefore we have that g(γ
∗)
g(β∗)
≥ 1, which concludes
the proof.
To conclude this section we will make two comments.
First, it is very interesting to observe that both players bene-
fit from hierarchy. This results it not usual in game-theoretic
studies. In economics, for instance, in the case of a duopoly
[16], only the leader can benefit from the introduction of hi-
erarchy. As a second comment, we note that both users not
only obtain a better energy-efficiency in the proposed Stack-
elberg game but it can also be checked that they transmit
with a lower power than in the non-cooperative game (Sec.
3), which could be roughly interpreted by saying that cog-
nition incites selfish people to use their resources in a more
clever manner.
5. A HIERARCHICAL GAME WITH SUC-
CESSIVE INTERFERENCE CANCELA-
TION
In this section the receiver is assumed to implement suc-
cessive interference cancelation. The principle of SIC is to
rank the users and decode them successively (see e.g. [1]).
For the 2-user case the decoding is a two-stage process. In
the first stage, the receiver decodes a user (say user 1) by
considering the other (user 2) as part of the noise. In the
second stage, i.e. after the first user has been decoded suc-
cessfully, the first user can be subtracted from the received
signal and user 2 is decoded without multiuser interference.
Compared to the case of the SUD-based receiver, the SIC-
based does not require any additional knowledge and there-
fore always only use the receiver channel state information
(h1, ..., hK) on each block of data, just as SUD. From a prac-
tical point of view the two main differences between SIC and
SUD is that SIC is more complex to be implemented and the
decoding order has to be known to the users. For the lat-
ter point, as mentioned in [4], it does not necessarily mean
that the receiver has to send a signal for indicating the de-
coding order to the user. In fact, the information can also
be acquired from an external (and therefore free in terms of
signalling cost) source of signal. However, there is generally
in this case a loss of optimality for the overall network per-
formance. Clearly, one of the main advantages for using a
SIC at the receiver is to partially remove some multiuser in-
terference. Note that, in the context of system with mutual
user interaction, improving the decoding scheme does not al-
ways imply that each user improves his utility. It turns out
it is the case in the game under investigation. We will see
that using a SIC leads to a non-negative gain for the indi-
vidual energy-efficiency of every user. A second nice feature
of the SIC is that it unconditionally insures the existence
and uniqueness of an equilibrium. All the issues we have
just mentioned are precisely the purpose of this section.
Proposition 5.1. (Existence and uniqueness of an
NE). Assume K ≥ 2. Without loss of generality assume that
a user receives the index i if he is decoded with rank K−i+1
in the successive decoding procedure at the receiver. In the
non-cooperative game with a SIC-based receiver where the
utility is chosen to be given by Eq. (3) where the SINRs
are those considered at the output of the SIC, there exists a
unique (pure) Nash equilibrium (p
(SIC)
1 , ..., p
(SIC)
K ) which is
given by:
∀i ∈ {1, ..., K}, p(SIC)i =
σ2
|hi|2
β
∗(1 + β∗)i−1. (18)
Proof. First note that, in the output of the SIC, the
SINR of user i is given by
SINRi = β
∗ =
pi|hi|
2
σ2 +
∑i−1
j=0 |hj |
2pj
. (19)
Although we deal here with a non-linear receiver we see that
every output SINR has the same key property as for linear
receivers [6][11] i.e. pi
∂SINRi
∂pi
= SINRi. Thus, in order
to maximize its utility (Eq. (3)) each user has to tune its
transmit power such that its SINR is equal to β(SIC) = β∗
where β∗f ′(β∗) = f(β∗). Knowing this, it is easy to express
the best responses of the (two) users: BR1(p2) =
σ2
|h1|2
β∗
and BR2(p1) =
|h1|
2
|h2|2
β∗p1 +
σ2
|h2|2
β∗. In the plane of strate-
gies (p1, p2) these two responses have always an intersection
(which insures the existence of a Nash equilibrium) and it
is unique. The expressions of the transmit powers at the
equilibrium follow.
As we did in Sec. 4 through Prop. 4.4 we now want to
compare the energy-efficiency obtained by the users in the
(SIC-based) hierarchical game with those obtained in the
(SUD-based) non-cooperative game.
Proposition 5.2. (Uniform improvement of utili-
ties). Let K = 2. Assume β∗ < 1. Using a SIC-based
receiver instead of a SUD-based receiver allows every user
to improve his utility.
Proof. Without loss of generality consider user 1. The
ratio of its utility at the NE when a SUD is assumed to that
obtained when a SIC is assumed is:
u
(SIC)
1
u
(SUD)
1
=
R1f(β
∗)
p
(SIC)
1
p
(SUD)
1
R1f(β∗)
(20)
=
p
(SUD)
1
p
(SIC)
1
(21)
=
1
1− (β∗)d
(22)
(a)
≥ 1 (23)
where d = 1 if user 1 is decoded in second or d = 2 if he is
decoded first and inequality (a) is verified since β∗ ≥ 0. The
reasoning we just made is also valid for user 2.
At this point we have proved that in both proposed hierar-
chical and non-symmetric games the utility of every player
is improved w.r.t. the non-cooperative game. Note that
the results hold for the 2–user case, which is the most sim-
ple case to treat and introduce the new concepts needed.
Now we also want to compare the two proposed hierarchical
games between themselves. More precisely, we want to com-
pare the utilities obtained at the SE with SUD with those
obtained at the NE when SIC is assumed. This comparison
is obviously unfair since the reception schemes are different.
However it might correspond to a question that a system
designer could ask himself. The main issue is to know if
there could exist scenarios where a Stackelberg game with
SUD could perform better than a non-cooperative game with
a superior reception scheme that mitigate interference. In
other words, can a nice game theoretic formulation compen-
sate for a suboptimal choice in terms of decoding scheme?
The answer is provided in the following proposition (Prop.
5.3).
Proposition 5.3. (Comparison between the two hi-
erarchical games). For any user i ∈ {1, 2} we have the
following results:
1. It is better for user i to be decoded last in the non-
cooperative game with SIC than being the follower in
the Stackelberg game with SUD.
2. It is better for user i to be decoded last in the non-
cooperative game with SIC than being the leader in
the Stackelberg game with SUD.
3. It is better for user i to be decoded first in the non-
cooperative game with SIC than being the leader in
the Stackelberg game with SUD.
Proof. Notations: we always denote by u
(SE)
L (resp. u
(SE)
F )
the utility of user i ∈ {1, 2} when it is chosen to be the leader
(follower) of the game. We also denote by u
(SIC)
− (resp.
u
(SIC)
+ ) the utility of user i ∈ {1, 2} when it is decoded in
the first (resp. last) position.
(1)
u
(SIC)
+
u
(SE)
F
= 1+γ
∗
1−β∗γ∗
≥ 1 since 0 ≤ γ∗ ≤ β∗ < 1.
(2) By Proposition 4.3,
u
(SIC)
+
u
(SE)
L
≥
u
(SIC)
+
u
(SE)
F
≥ 1.
(3)
u
(SIC)
−
u
(SE)
L
=
f(β∗)
β∗
f(γ∗)
γ∗
1
1−β∗γ∗
≥
f(β∗)
β∗
f(γ∗)
γ∗
≥ 1 because h : x 7→
f(x)
x
reaches its maximum in β∗ and 0 ≤ γ∗ ≤ β∗ < 1.
Conjecture 5.4. It is better for user i to be decoded first
in the non-cooperative game with SIC than being the follower
in the Stackelberg game with SUD if γ∗ > β
∗
1+β∗+(β∗)2
. Oth-
erwise, user i has a better utility in the Stackelberg game
with SUD.
This conjecture is supported by the fact that
u
(SIC)
−
u
(SE)
F
= 1+γ
∗
1+β∗
1
1−β∗γ∗
and this quantity is greater than 1 if and only if γ∗ ≥
β∗
1+β∗+(β∗)2
. At the time this paper is submitted we have
not proved this conjecture yet. Hopefully it will be available
for the final version of this paper. The critical regime we
emphasize here shows a case where a Stackelberg game for
which the multiuser interference is not canceled leads for a
better utility for the follower than that he would have in a
system where it is canceled for the other user. But in terms
of global network efficiency, the answer is not clear. We
will treat such issues in the next section where we focus on
measures of efficiency of the whole system and not on the
individual utilities.
After analyzing the two proposed hierarchical games a le-
gitimate question that might be asked is: Why not combin-
ing the two approaches by choosing a leader/follower in the
case of a SIC-based receiver? It turns out that in SIC-based
game, the Stackelberg formulation coincides with its non-
cooperative counterpart. Said otherwise, there is no point
introducing more hierarchy in the SIC-based game. Show-
ing this is the purpose of the following reasoning. Without
loss of generality, assume that user 1 is the leader and user
2 the follower. The corresponding SE is given by Eq. (11)
and (12). Now there are two possible scenarios depending
on the user chosen to be decoded first/last.
• Scenario 1: The leader is decoded last. Then his SINR
only depends on his power level p1. The leader’s strat-
egy at the Stackelberg equilibrium is
p
SE
1 = arg max
p1
u1(p1) =
σ2
|h1|2
β
∗ = p
(SIC)
1 . (24)
This implies that, at the equilibrium, the follower’s
strategy (who plays after the leader) is
p
SE
2 = arg max
p2
u2(p
SE
1 , p2) =
σ2
|h2|2
β
∗(1+β∗) = p
(SIC)
2 .
(25)
Clearly, the Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the
Nash equilibrium in this scenario.
• Scenario 2: The leader is decoded first. Then, the
SINR of the follower only depends on his transmission
power p2 and his strategy at the Stackelberg equilib-
rium is
p
SE
2 = arg max
p2
u2(p2) =
σ2
|h2|2
β
∗ = p
(SIC)
1 . (26)
This corresponds to the strategy of the last decoded
player in the non-cooperative game using SIC. The
leader of the Stackelberg game optimizes his utility
where the decision of the follower does not depend on
his strategy. Actually, we observe that it is no more
a Stackelberg game, as the follower decision does not
depend on the leader decision. At the equilibrium, the
leader’s decision is:
p
SE
1 = arg max
p1
u1(p1, p
SE
2 ) =
σ2
|h1|2
β
∗(1+β∗) = p
(SIC)
2 ,
(27)
which coincides with the strategy played by the user
decoded first in the non-cooperative game with SIC.
6. NETWORKENERGY-EFFICIENCYANAL-
YSIS
So far, in the two hierarchical games analyzed previously,
we have assumed an arbitrary choice for the follower (Stack-
elberg game with SUD) and decoding order (non-cooperative
game with SIC). In this section we want to optimize the
overall network energy-efficiency with respect to the afore-
mentioned degrees of freedom. For this purpose we consider
two measures: the social welfare [17] which is well known
in game theoretic studies and the energy-efficiency of the
equivalent virtual multiple input multiple output (MIMO)
system, the latter being used to optimize power allocation in
multicarrier CDMA systems [6]. This will allow us to have
two complementary points of view on the way of measuring
the energy-efficiency of a network. As a comment regard-
ing the terminology used, note that if the non-cooperative
game with SIC is optimized in terms of a certain measure
of energy-efficiency of the global network, the game can be
seen as a Stackelberg game where: (a) the receiver is the
game leader; (b) its set of strategies is the set of all decod-
ing orders; (c) its utility is w (Eq. (28)) or v (Eq. (30)); (d)
the users are the followers.
6.1 Social welfare
The social welfare of the network is measured by the total
utility of the system expressed as follows:
w =
K∑
i=1
ui =
K∑
i=1
Ti
pi
. (28)
For this measure we have the following two results for the
two games with 2 players.
Proposition 6.1. (Best choice of the follower).
Assume a Stackelberg game with SUD. Let K = 2. In or-
der to maximize the social welfare the user who has the best
Ri|hi|
2 has to be chosen as the game follower.
Proof. Let w(1) (resp. w(2)) be the social welfare when
user 1 (resp. user 2) is chosen to be the follower. We have
that
w
(1) = R2
f(γ∗)|h2|
2(1− γ∗β∗)
σ2γ∗(1 + β∗)
+ R1
f(β∗)|h1|
2(1− γ∗β∗)
σ2β∗(1 + γ∗)
w
(2) = R1
f(γ∗)|h1|
2(1− γ∗β∗)
σ2γ∗(1 + β∗)
+ R2
f(β∗)|h2|
2(1− γ∗β∗)
σ2β∗(1 + γ∗)
.
Therefore
w(2) − w(1) =
1−γ∗β∗
σ2
(
R2|h2|
2 −R1|h1|
2
)
×
[
f(β∗)
β∗(1+γ∗)
− f(γ
∗)
γ∗(1+β∗)
]
.
Since we know that f(β
∗)
β∗
>
f(γ∗)
γ∗
and β∗ > γ∗, we see that
the difference is positive if and only if R2|h2|
2 > R1|h1|
2,
which concludes the proof.
Proposition 6.2. (Best decoding order). Assume a
non-cooperative game with SIC. Let K ≥ 2. The best decod-
ing order in the sense of the social welfare is to decode the
users in the increasing order of their energy weighted by the
coding rate Ri|hi|
2.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. From
these two propositions we see that using the social welfare
as a global measure of efficiency always gives an advantage
to the dominant user in asymmetric channels i.e. for which
|hi|
2 >> |hj |
2 for i 6= j. Indeed, in the Stackelberg game
with SUD the strongest user is chosen to be the follower
and in the non-cooperative game with SIC he is chosen to
be decoded last. In the limit case where |h1|
|h2|
→ +∞, we
have that
lim
|h1|
|h2|
→+∞
w = +∞. (29)
Therefore if one user becomes more and more satisfied the
whole society becomes more and more satisfied. Clearly, the
social welfare as defined by Eq. (28) is not that social one
could expect in the sense it ignores unfairness. This is one
of the reasons why other measures of efficiency can be used.
In the next subsection we propose to consider the efficiency
of the equivalent virtual MIMO system.
6.2 Equivalent virtualMIMOnetwork (EVMN)
energy-efficiency
We consider now another performance metric which cor-
responds to the energy-efficiency of an equivalent system
where the transmitters would be co-located. It is described
in [6] as the individual utility in the context of multi-carrier
systems:
v =
∑K
i=1 Ti∑K
i=1 pi
. (30)
Interestingly, one can obtain very different conclusions by
optimizing this quantity with respect to the degrees of free-
dom instead of the social welfare. The following two propo-
sitions illustrate this point.
Proposition 6.3. (Best choice of the follower).
Assume a Stackelberg game with SUD. Let K = 2. With-
out loss of generality assume that |hi|
2 < |hj |
2, i 6= j. In
order to maximize energy efficiency of the equivalent virtual
MIMO user i (resp. j) has to be chosen as the game leader
if aRi ≤ Rj (resp. aRi ≥ Rj) where a < 1 is defined by a ,
f(β∗)α2−f(γ
∗)α1
f(β∗)α1−f(γ∗)α2
with α1 = |hi|
2γ∗(1 + β∗) + |hj |
2β∗(1 + γ∗)
and α2 = |hj |
2γ∗(1 + β∗) + |hi|
2β∗(1 + γ∗).
Proof. Note that a < 1 since β∗ > γ∗ and |hi|
2 ≤ |hj |
2.
Let v(k) be the EVMN when user k is the leader. From the
definition of v we have
v
(i) =
Rif(γ
∗) + Rjf(β
∗)
p
(i)
tot
(31)
v
(j) =
Rjf(γ
∗) + Rif(β
∗)
p
(j)
tot
(32)
where p
(k)
tot is the total power at equilibrium when user k is
the game leader. Thus
v
(i) − v(j) =
Rif(γ
∗) + Rjf(β
∗)
p
(i)
tot
−
Rif(β
∗) + Rjf(γ
∗)
p
(j)
tot
=
Ri
[
f(γ∗)p
(j)
tot − f(β
∗)p
(i)
tot
]
+ Rj
[
f(β∗)p
(j)
tot − f(γ
∗)p
(i)
tot
]
p
(i)
totp
(j)
tot
Hence, this term is positive if user i is chosen as the leader.
This occurs when
Rj
[
f(β∗)p
(j)
tot − f(γ
∗)p
(i)
tot
]
≥ Ri
[
f(γ∗)p
(j)
tot + f(β
∗)p
(i)
tot
]
(33)
As we have p
(i)
tot =
σ2
1−γ∗β∗
α2
|hihj |2
and p
(j)
tot =
σ2
1−γ∗β∗
α1
|hihj |2
the condition above (Eq. (33)) is equivalent to
Ri
[
f(β∗)α2 − f(γ
∗)α1
f(β∗)α1 − f(γ∗)α2
]
≤ Rj , (34)
which concludes the proof.
Proposition 6.4. (Best decoding order). Assume a
non-cooperative game with SIC. Let K ≥ 2. The best de-
coding order in the sense of the equivalent virtual MIMO
network energy-efficiency is to decode the users in the de-
creasing order of their signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) |hi|
2
σ2
.
Proof. Let pi ∈ P be a permutation operator corre-
sponding to the choice of the decoding order. Since the
users have the same SINR at the equilibrium we have that
w =
f(β∗)×
∑K
i=1 Ri∑
K
i=1 p
SIC
i
. Therefore,
pi
∗ = arg max
pi∈P
w
(pi) = arg min
pi∈P
K∑
i=1
p
(SIC)
i . (35)
As p
(SIC)
i =
σ2
|hi|2
β∗(1 + β∗)i−1 it is clear that the influence
of a user on the sum of powers decreases with its decoding
rank. To minimize the total system power one has to decode
the users with a decreasing order of their SNR.
In order to establish a connection between the social effi-
ciency measure used in game theory (w) and that used as a
bound of a cooperative communication system (v) we now
look at the properties of these measures of network energy-
efficiency. Note that the main difference we have between
our situation and that of multi-carrier systems [6] is that it
is not possible here to optimally allocate the total power be-
tween the different users i.e. the power is not a transferable
utility from a user to another one.
1. Uniform improvement of utilities. If the utilities of
users 1 and 2 are improved as follows u1 to u
′
1 ≥ u1
and u2 to u
′
2 ≥ u2 then the social welfare is also
improved as w to w′ ≥ w. Assuming the optimal
choice of the follower/leader or first/last decoded user
in the corresponding game, a sufficient condition for
the EVMN energy-efficiency v for having this property
is γ∗ ≥ β
∗
1+β∗+(β∗)2
.
2. Behavior for asymmetric channels. We already know
that lim
|h1|
|h2|
→+∞
w = +∞. An equivalent of v when
|h1|
|h2|
→ +∞ is v ∼ |h2|
2
σ2
β∗(R1 + R2)f(β
∗). Now,
with the latter measure of energy-efficiency, if a user
increases his pay-off, the MIMO network does not im-
prove.
3. Resource sharing. The EVMN energy-efficiency is a
fairer performance criterion than the social efficiency
for the SIC but not for the Stackelberg with SUD.
• Case of SIC. Maximizing w over the choice of de-
coding order amounts to giving more to the rich-
est user in terms of Ri|hi|
2. Maximizing v over
the choice of decoding order amounts to giving
more to the poorest user in terms of |hi|
2.
• Case of Stackelberg with SUD. Maximizing w over
the follower/leader choice amounts to giving more
to the richest user in terms of Ri|hi|
2. Maximiz-
ing v over the follower/leader choice amounts to
giving more to the richest user in terms of |hi|
2.
7. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
The main objective of this section is to evaluate numeri-
cally the relative gain brought by the introduction of hierar-
chy with respect to the non-cooperative game. To this end
we introduce the quantity
Ui =
ui − u
NE
i
uNEi
(36)
where ui = u
SE
i or ui = u
SIC
i , depending on the hierarchical
game under consideration. Similarly, we define W and V to
measure the relative gain in terms of global performance.
We consider the efficiency function proposed in most papers
dealing with power allocation games that is:
f(x) = (1− e−x)M (37)
where M = 100 is the block length in bits. We assume a
CDMA system with a spreading factor N ∈ {8, 16, 32}. The
thermal noise power σ2 is chosen to be equal to 5×10−16 W.
As mentioned at the end of Sec. 3, in CDMA systems us-
ing the mentioned spreading codes the denominator of the
transmit power at the NE becomes proportional to 1 − β
∗
N
and therefore what matters for the existence of the NE is
that β
∗
N
< 1. For the setup presented here β∗ = 6.48
and therefore we have that the latter condition is met for
N ∈ {8, 16, 32}.
7.1 Uniform improvement of utilities
Assume K = 2. We consider that the transmission rates
for the first and second users are respectively R1 = 100 kbps
and R2 = 140 kbps. Assuming the Stackelberg formulation
with SUD, Fig. 1 represents the relative gain in [%] in terms
of individual utility as a function of the spreading factor for
each user. Clearly both users can benefit from a significant
performance gain, especially for small values of the load K
N
.
If SIC is assumed at the receiver, the gains of the hierarchical
approach over the non-cooperative approach are even more
significant as shows Fig. 2.
16 32
N
 
User is leader
User is follower
Figure 1: Individual relative performance gains
(w.r.t. the non-cooperative game) for the 2 users
when a Stackelberg with SUD is assumed at the re-
ceiver.
16 32
N
 
User is decoded first
User is decoded last
Figure 2: Individual relative performance gains
(w.r.t. the non-cooperative game) for the 2 users
when SIC is assumed at the receiver.
7.2 Comparison between the two hierarchical
games
We now evaluate the relative performance gain brought
by our approaches in terms of social welfare and EVMN
energy-efficiency. The channel gains are fixed and chosen to
be |h1| = 2.23 × 10
−6 and |h2| = c|h1| where c represents
the asymmetry of the 2−user MAC. First, we consider the
hierarchy game based on the Stackelberg formulation with
SUD a the receiver and plot the social welfare and EVMN
efficiency as a function of c. As the channel becomes more
and more asymmetric the choice of the leader becomes more
and more influential, in particular for extreme values of c.
For example, in Fig. 3(c), the worse choice of the leader in-
duces a negative relative gain for the EVMN efficiency (when
c > 2 or c < 0.8). When the spreading factor increases, the
benefit from choosing the best leader is a more crucial choice
for the EVMN efficiency than the social welfare. We have
also plotted the social welfare and EVMN energy-efficiency
in the case of the hierarchical game with SIC as a function
of c on Fig. 4. We observe in the SIC-based game the same
behavior as in the Stackelberg game with SUD. For both
hierarchical games, the relative gain in terms of global effi-
ciency obtained by introducing the hierarchy with the best
choice of leader or decoding order can bring very significant
performance gains if the MAC is asymmetric. We also ob-
serve that the most significant improvements are obtained
for small values of the system load K
N
.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c
 
MIMO: Best decoding order
SW: Best decoding order
SW: Bad decoding order
MIMO: Bad decoding order
Figure 4: Global relative performance gains (w.r.t.
the non-cooperative game) for the 2 users when SIC
is assumed at the receiver with N = 16.
8. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have analyzed the effect of hierarchy in
energy-efficient power control games both on the individual
performance of a given user and the overall network perfor-
mance. Interestingly, the existence and uniqueness of equi-
libria in the considered games is insured under reasonable
assumptions. In fact, when assuming successive multiuser
interference cancelation at the receiver, which reduces the
interaction between some users, the existence and unique-
ness of a Nash equilibrium is always guaranteed. We have
shown that is is also possible, at least for the 2-player game,
to characterize completely and analytically the efficiency of
these equilibria. Compared to most existing analyses con-
ducted in other fields (e.g. in economics) for which game
theory is applied, some unusual results have been obtained.
In particular it is shown that both the leader and follower
benefit from hierarchy and that social welfare can be an
unfair measure of energy-efficiency of the global network.
We believe that the approaches that consist in devising net-
works where intelligence is split in a clever manner between
the network infrastructure and (generally mobile) terminals
is a good way of achieving good performance in terms of
energy-efficiency while achieving a desired target in terms
of signalling cost. In this respect, the case of the SIC re-
ceiver clearly shows that the coordination signal does not
need necessarily to be sent by the receiver but can be gener-
ated from a source external to the game (for instance from
an FM signal). Relevant extensions of the presented work
would consist in: (a) Extending the proposed approach to
the case of networks with an arbitrary number of users. For
the Stackelberg game with SUD in particular, the problem
can be formulated in several ways, depending whether only
one leader is designated or a class of leaders is assumed; (b)
Deriving tight bounds on the price of anarchy of the network
with possibly different measures of efficiency; (c) Assuming
multi-carrier systems; (d) Studying the case of several re-
ceivers and the way they have to interact (e.g. the hierar-
chical uplink multi-cell game); (e) Analyzing the impact of
channel uncertainty on the users’ behavior and individual
performance.
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